| Project Detail |
Empirical insights into the tangled web of decentralisation
In the Global South, decentralisation reforms have been fervently embraced as solutions to a myriad of issues, from poor public services to corruption. These reforms, most notably in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), are touted for promoting citizen participation and accountability. However, the crucial question remains: are decentralisation reforms truly delivering on their promises? With the support of the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions programme, the LG-Conflict project seeks to unravel the complex dynamics of decentralisation. With a particular focus on Tunisia, this research effort aims to assess the extent to which these reforms genuinely redistribute decision-making power, scrutinising the conditions under which conflicts arise between central government appointees and locally elected officials.
Decentralization reforms in the Global South have witnessed a surge since the 1980s, embraced by governments and international donors as a solution to myriad problems from poor public services and territorial inequalities to corruption and low public trust. Decentralization reforms have been introduced across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Many of these reforms are strongly supported by international donors on the assumption that they promote citizen participation, accountability and local development. However, there is little empirical assessment of whether decentralization reforms are, in fact, achieving these purported benefits.
Following decentralization reforms in the MENA in the past decade, prominent conflicts have taken place between appointed and elected subnational officials. The researchers own PhD research on the politics of decentralization reforms in Tunisia in 2011-19 suggests that decentralization reforms and the entry of thousands of elected local councillors into politics is challenging the existing distribution of power between elected local politicians and centrally-appointed regional or municipal officials. Conflicts between these two groups and their outcomes have significant implications for both the democratic and developmental benefits of decentralization. This research project seeks to identify to what extent decentralization reforms serve to redistribute decision-making power from central government to local elected representatives, and under what conditions. Specifically, it asks when and why appointed central government representatives and local elected officials come into conflict following decentralization, and under which conditions local elected officials are able to successfully resist bureaucratic opposition where conflict occurs, thus asserting local autonomy. These questions are central to reform processes that can deliver tangible improvements for the lives of millions. |
