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The recent Iberian grid blackout should not be interpreted as a failure of renewables. But it has given Europe a signal that the energy system is changing, and has shed light on the need to govern 21st-century technologies with 21st-century control systems. By Xavier Daval , Director of the Global Solar Council (GSC) Board of Directors. The blackout that occurred in Spain on April 28 was neither a surprise nor a malfunction. It embodies a deeper tension of our time, between those who embrace change and those who cling to outdated systems in the name of security. Like all technological change, it reflects a broader divide: a worldview that welcomes innovation versus one that clings to legacy frameworks. The Spanish blackout should not be interpreted as a failure of renewable energy, but as a wake-up call that reveals the rigidity with which our electrical infrastructure continues to cling to its historical foundations. This event, which affected almost the entire Iberian grid and parts of southwestern France, stands out as a major energy incident in recent European memory. Although the response, particularly in France, was swift and effective, the incident revealed structural vulnerabilities that our energy systems will increasingly face in the coming years. Like most European systems, the Spanish grid is meshed: it consists of interconnected zones that constantly exchange electricity. When a disturbance occurs in one of these zones, such as the sudden loss of a generating unit or major infrastructure, a local imbalance arises between generation and demand, causing the frequency to immediately drop below the 50 Hz reference. This phenomenon, although well understood in theory, takes on a new dimension in a system where solar and wind resources are widely deployed and geographically distributed. In such a system, the behavior of inverters becomes critical to the stability of the local grid. When frequency drops sharply in a given area, these digital generators could help sustain the grid if they were allowed to remain connected. However, according to the current European Grid Code, these facilities must automatically disconnect when the frequency falls below the 48 Hz threshold. This protection mechanism, inherited from a grid paradigm based on rotational inertia, deprives the system of valuable energy precisely when it is most needed. This premature withdrawal exacerbates the local imbalance, accelerates the frequency drop, and can trigger a cascade of further disconnections in neighboring areas. Thus, through a domino effect, a single event becomes a widespread collapse, like a house of cards falling piece by piece. In contrast, France demonstrated remarkable resilience. Its cross-border interconnections helped absorb the initial shock, while automated protections isolated part of the southwest to contain the spread. Thanks to this system architecture and the rapid intervention of the RTE (the French electricity transmission network), the situation stabilized within minutes. This resilience is based on several key features: strong structural inertia, largely thanks to the nuclear fleet, which naturally dampens frequency fluctuations; a more balanced distribution of generating assets across the country; sufficient rotating reserves to respond immediately to power losses; and, finally, solid interconnections with neighboring countries that allow for real-time regional resource sharing. It is important to emphasize that this nuclear inertia does not hinder the energy transition, but rather facilitates it. It constitutes a valuable technical basis that allows France to integrate increasing volumes of renewable electricity while maintaining system stability. This structural complementarity between nuclear and renewable energy, far from being contradictory, could serve as a European model for a safe and well-managed transition. More than an isolated incident, the blackout should be understood as a weak signal of a paradigm shift: the transition from a system based on predictability, centralization, and mechanical inertia to one that is increasingly distributed, dynamic, and responsive to local conditions. An event like this invites two interpretations. One is a nervous interpretation, which sees it as just another technical glitch. The other is more lucid: it reveals how much we still have to do to adapt our grids to the realities of the energy transition. Our current grid architecture was designed for a world of centralized, linear, and predictable generation. But we now live in an increasingly distributed, adaptable, and digital electricity world. We are not facing a glitch that needs to be fixed, but a model that needs to be fundamentally redesigned. In this context, blaming renewables for Spains blackout is like blaming a thermometer for a fever. The automatic disconnection of generating units when critical frequency thresholds are exceeded is not a defect inherent to renewables, but the result of safety protocols developed for a system dominated by inertia. This rule, which applies to all types of generation, including nuclear, is designed to protect equipment from extreme frequency deviations. But in a grid increasingly powered by electronic sources, such as solar and wind inverters, this logic can backfire, depriving the system of capacity precisely when it is most needed. As renewable energy becomes more widespread, it will be increasingly close to the source of grid imbalances—not as a source of fragility, but as a reservoir of flexibility. That is, if we allow them to remain online, contribute to frequency maintenance, and help stabilize the system. Yet today, these digital generators are still forced offline when they could act as buffers. The problem is not their nature, but our failure to integrate them as active resources for grid reliability. Its time we govern 21st-century technologies with 21st-century control systems. This isnt a Spanish problem. All of Europe now faces a challenge similar to the one it overcame in telecommunications three decades ago. By inventing GSM (Mobile Networks), Europe managed to transform a patchwork of national systems into a global engine of innovation. Today, with its diverse energy mixes, consumption profiles, and geographical constraints, Europe once again has a unique opportunity: to reinvent its power grids as it reinvented mobile communications: in a smart, collaborative, and resilient way. Solar energy will prevail not because of ideology, but because of efficiency. It is free, universal, and abundant. Conversion systems are becoming more affordable, efficient, and accessible every year. Their deployment is simple, decentralized, and scalable. As in the telecommunications sector, some countries will move directly to distributed grid architectures and avoid the centralized model altogether. Pakistans experience in 2024 is instructive. Faced with a fragile grid, daily blackouts, and sky-high electricity prices, the country experienced a grassroots movement toward adopting solar energy. In just a few months, 17 GW of panels were imported and millions of rooftops were equipped. Solar energy didnt cause the grid to collapse; it was the answer. What Pakistan is doing out of urgency, others will do out of strategic choice. The April 28 incident will not be the first, nor the last. It is one of many signs that the system is changing. Renewable energy penetration is reaching historic levels. Weather conditions are increasingly unpredictable. And in this transition, every disruption offers an opportunity to learn. If Europe may have missed the first industrial leap of the energy revolution, it cannot afford to miss the next: the governance, architecture, and intelligent control of tomorrows grids. We shouldnt fear the future. These disruptions arent threats, theyre promises. They force us to innovate, to rethink, to build differently. Solar energy, like the light it captures, illuminates the path forward. The only question is: will we know how to position the mirrors? |
